• Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2012)
      Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same ...
    • Does the structure of the fine matter? 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2013)
      We study individual compliance behavior with respect to a legal norm in an experimental setting under two different regulatory instruments: emission standards and tradable pollution permits. ...
    • Getting polluters to yell the truth 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2006)
      We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the regulator asks firms to ...
    • Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan; Figueroa, Nicolás (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2016)
      It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and ...
    • Spatial spillovers in the implicit market price of soil erosion: an estimation using a spatio-temporal hedonic model 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Vásquez Lavín, Felipe; Rodríguez Anza, Daniel; Carrasco-Letelier, Leonidas; Hernández, José Ignacio; Buonomo, Mariela (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2019)
      We estimate the implicit market price of soil erosion, fitting a spatio-temporal hedonic price model using quarterly data of 3,563 agricultural farms traded in Uruguay between 2000 and 2014. A unique feature of our estimation ...
    • The deterrence effect of linear versus convex penalties in environmental policy: laboratory evidence 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2017)
      We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly convex) and two different regulatory ...
    • The effect of temporary and intense exposure to particulate matter on birth outcomes in Montevideo 

      Balsa, Ana Inés; Caffera, Marcelo; Bloomfield, Juanita (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2015)
      Background: Prior estimates of the correlation between ambient air pollutants’ concentrations and perinatal health show dispersion in magnitudes, as well as positive and negative signs. These differences may be partially ...
    • Uncertain penalties and compliance 

      Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2019)
      We present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the penalty is uncertain. The experiments consist of a regulatory environment ...
    • Uncertain penalties and compliance 

      Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2014)
      Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis ...